{"id":595,"date":"2018-09-02T15:24:15","date_gmt":"2018-09-02T22:24:15","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/bruceramsey.net\/?page_id=595"},"modified":"2019-05-25T19:20:42","modified_gmt":"2019-05-26T02:20:42","slug":"the-theory-2004","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/bruceramsey.net\/index.php\/the-theory-2004\/","title":{"rendered":"The Theory (2004)"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
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\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/b>By the early 2000s I was listed as a senior editor of Liberty, which really meant that I had written a lot of stuff Bill Bradford liked, though he didn\u2019t agree with all of it. In the summer of 2003, Liberty senior editor Steve Cox, a professor of literature at University of California San Diego, nominated me to attend a seminar at Princeton University with a libertarian political science professor from Columbia University, Jeffrey Friedman. The seminar was called \u201cchallenges to classical liberalism\u201d \u2014 classical liberalism being the alternate name for libertarianism. The organizers sent me a stack of readings of philosophers and other writers, including an old excerpt from Public Opinion, a 1922 book Walter Lippmann, to read beforehand. Friedman\u2019s donors paid my way back and my accommodations. My quid pro quo was to write about it. As it turned out, Bill Bradford didn\u2019t want it for Liberty \u2014 he had had enough about Jeff Friedman, he said \u2014 so I offered it to www.mises.org, an Austrian economics site, and they posted it in October 2004.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t

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\u00a0<\/span><\/b>\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Jeffrey Friedman is wrapping up the first day of his seminar in the summer of 2003. \u201cWe have gotten off the table the idea that freedom is inherently valuable, or that capitalism is inherently valuable,\u201d he says. \u201cWhat we have left is that capitalism may be more valuable than the alternative, given the consequences.\u201d<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0We eleven are mostly students, conservatives or libertarians. Several are from Yale and Harvard, one from Oxford. Three are members of the press.\u00a0We have come to Princeton, our way paid by donors who want us to hear what Friedman has to say.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Friedman is 44, the son of an atheist rabbi. He is dark-haired, intense, exacting, and with a quick smile. He is a teacher of political science at Barnard College, New York. He says he started adult life as \u201can annoying Rothbardian anarcho-capitalist.\u201d Among libertarians he is famous, and also a bit infamous, for his seminars that deconstruct their creed.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Years ago, Friedman became dismayed with the showing of libertarians in academia. Even Robert Nozick, author of the acclaimed\u00a0Anarchy, State and Utopia<\/i>, was emerging from academic warfare severely damaged. \u201cProfessors teach Nozick because he is so easy to dismiss,\u201d Friedman says.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0He started an academic journal,\u00a0Critical Review<\/i>, to strengthen libertarian ideas by testing them against opponents. To his chagrin, he says, the opponents were winning.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0By the early 1990s Friedman says, he had abandoned libertarianism, though \u201cnot for an alternative.\u201d He developed a completely empirical view, he says, and began poking through studies in political science. \u201cI began finding nuggets of research that the usual people didn\u2019t see,\u201d he says. \u201cThey were things it takes a libertarian to see.\u201d And these, he says, now form the basis of \u201ca case that doesn\u2019t walk the traditional path.\u201d<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0It is to consider this case that he has invited us for three days at Princeton.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>

Deconstructing liberty\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0First the way must be cleared. Our old ideas must be deconstructed, starting with our idea of liberty. The attack comes in an essay by a Marxist, one G.A. Cohen of Oxford University.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Now, I work in the press. We deal with lots of left-liberals. We don\u2019t have Marxists. The idea of seriously\u00a0arguing\u00a0<\/i>with a Marxist\u00a0<\/i>seems, well, preposterous. We don\u2019t argue with Nazis. After the 20th century, why do we even\u00a0talk\u00a0<\/i>to Marxists? I mention at lunch that it seems strange to be having a dispute with a communist. The fellow from Oxford looks pained and says, \u201cCohen\u2019s not a communist. He\u2019s a market socialist.\u201d<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Oh. Progress, then.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Cohen\u2019s \u201cCapitalism, Freedom and the Proletariat\u201d (1979), starts by quoting philosopher Jan Narveson\u2019s definition of liberty as \u201cdoing what we wish without the interference of others.\u201d This is a bad definition, and Cohen makes the most of it.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Cohen says, \u201cLet us suppose that I wish to take Mr. Morgan\u2019s yacht, and go for a spin. If I try to, then it is probable that its owner, aided by law-enforcing others, will stop me. I cannot do this thing that I wish to do, because others will interfere. But liberty, Narveson reasonably said, is \u2018doing what we wish without the interference of others.\u2019 It follows that I lack a liberty here.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u201cPatently, the point is generalizable. Private property always limits liberty.\u201d<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Notice that that Cohen posits a yacht, a rich person\u2019s property. He could just as well have posited a bicycle, and suggested that he had the right to take a student\u2019s bike for a spin. Not even a People\u2019s Republic would allow Cohen to do that.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0But I have to admit that private property does limit liberty. It\u00a0defines\u00a0<\/i>liberty. Liberty is really the permission to do what we wish with what we own, including ourselves. Cohen calls this a moralized liberty, and, Friedman adds, \u201cThe \u2018moralized\u2019 part of \u2018moralized liberty\u2019 is doing all the work.\u201d<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0I suppose it is. I can live with that. Jonathan Wolff argues in \u201cFreedom, Liberty and Property\u201d\u00a0(Critical Review<\/i>, Summer 1997) that we ought to use \u201cfreedom\u201d in the sense of possibility (\u201cMy leg iron is off; I am free to walk\u201d) and \u201cliberty\u201d in the sense of permissibility (\u201cI could walk if I wanted, but I am not at liberty to leave the house\u201d).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0I agree with Cohen that libertarian liberty is about the permissions you have in a world of private property. I mention to Friedman that I have long thought that the technically correct name for libertarianism is \u201cpropertarianism.\u201d\u00a0<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0He smiles.\u00a0\u201cExactly.\u201d<\/i><\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0But does that mean the liberty in libertarianism is bogus? Cohen thinks so, and Friedman seems to agree. In \u201cWhat\u2019s Wrong With Libertarianism\u201d (Critical Review<\/i>, Summer 1997), Friedman says: \u201cInasmuch as there is just as much of the world to be parceled out under each system\u2019s set of property rules, and the rights governing all of this property are just as coercively enforced in all systems, there is no difference in the \u2018amount\u2019 of coercion…\u201d<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0I was stunned by this statement. But in a very restricted sense it is true. In a capitalist society and a socialist society, there are places you are allowed to go and places you aren\u2019t. In both societies, everything is\u00a0owned\u00a0<\/i>by some individual, company, co-op, collective, or state agency. Further, all the properties that capitalism creates \u2014 patents, copyrights, bonds, stock options, futures, fishing rights, grocery coupons \u2014 are protected by force.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Friedman believes capitalism is preferable to socialism. But the reason, he says, is not that capitalism uses less force to set up and run. It\u2019s that capitalism allows people more choices that they will actually make use of. He and I have several back-and-forths about this. I begin to think that our disagreement is more one of labels than of essences. The amount of decision-making permitted me under capitalism, particularly my right to say \u201cno\u201d to people who would use my time and my property, is what I call \u201cliberty.\u201d Friedman has a different name for it, as we shall see. But he\u2019s for it.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>

Deconstructing property<\/span><\/b><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0What most of us call\u00a0liberty\u00a0<\/i>derives from what we own. But why do we own what we own?<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Because of the nature of man? Not quite. The Bushmen in the film, \u201cThe Gods Must Be Crazy\u201d are human, and their hunter-gatherer society does not have property. However, all agricultural societies have it. It says something that there is\u00a0no\u00a0<\/i>society in which you can walk up to another person\u2019s field and start planting your crops in it.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0But our job is to justify\u00a0capitalist\u00a0<\/i>property. In that regard, our first inclination is to say,\u00a0\u201cLook\u00a0<\/i>at capitalist property and socialist property. Private owners care for their properties and improve them; socialist citizens don\u2019t.\u201d<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0That is an excellent reason, but Friedman wants a more philosophical one.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The libertarian offers an argument from self-ownership. If your life is an end in itself, and you own your life, meaning you have the right to direct and control it, you should be allowed to obtain rights to direct and control\u00a0things<\/i>.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Why? Friedman asks, \u201cHow is self-ownership translated into world ownership?\u201d<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0If you own yourself, you own your talents; if you own your talents, you must own the\u00a0product\u00a0<\/i>of your talents.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The most obvious problem with that is land, because land is not a product of our talents. How did land become property? It was divided up by farmers, which was necessary if people were to grow food. But we want a philosophical reason\u2026<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Let\u2019s take an easier case: a painting. In \u201cFreedom, Self-Ownership and Libertarian Philosophical Diaspora,\u201d in the summer 1997\u00a0Critical Review,\u00a0<\/i>Justin Weinberg of Georgetown University supposes he paints a painting.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u201cIf that painting is taken away from me\u2014suppose it is appropriated by the state… then I no longer own the painting,\u201d Weinberg writes. \u201cBut I still fully own and possess my talents… If the state confiscates my earnings, it is not materially different from the state confiscating my painting; I still fully own my talents. So I still fully own myself.\u201d He can still paint another picture (and the state can take that one away, too).<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0I don\u2019t buy this. If the state has confiscated my painting, it has confiscated the product of my time and effort. To say, \u201cDon\u2019t worry, you still own your\u00a0talents<\/i>,\u201d is an apology for a thief.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0I want to own the painting. But I am alerted by Friedman\u2019s approach: I am not willing to make my ownership of the painting so fundamental that I don\u2019t care about any imaginable consequence. At one of the breaks, I go to Friedman and say, \u201cThat I own my painting is valuable to me. I\u2019d rather live in a society that let me own the painting even if it meant living in a poorer society. But I\u2019m not going to insist on owning the painting if the price is mass misery.\u201d<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u201cYou are a reasonable man,\u201d he says.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0What of the would-be painter who owns no paints, brushes, canvases or free time? Is self-ownership meaningful to him? Cohen, the Marxist, argues that it is not.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Cohen posits a world with two self-owning persons, Able and Infirm. Able can produce enough goods to sustain them both. Infirm cannot produce anything. Cohen stipulates that the two own the world jointly in a partnership that is undissolvable and self-enforcing, so that each must agree before either can touch anything. This means Able needs Infirm\u2019s permission before Able can do any work. Infirm would need Able\u2019s permission, too, but he can\u2019t work.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Cohen does not say this, but from Able\u2019s point of view, this is no different from Infirm owning everything.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Does Able have self-ownership? Cohen stipulated that he did. But will the libertarian be satisfied with his position? No. He is self-owned in theory, but he has no liberty.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Now consider the capital-less worker in a capitalist society. He cannot work without the agreement of an employer, Cohen says. Is his self-ownership any more meaningful than Able\u2019s?<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Cohen wants to say it is not, but he is wrong. He has put Able into a world where there is no market or possibility of one, because there can be no rival buyers or sellers. There is only Infirm, who has a 100% monopoly. Able is at his mercy.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0This is not the position of a worker under capitalism. The worker is at liberty to negotiate with any employer. He is at liberty to sell goods or services directly, and have no employer at all. He may sponge off his relatives or marry into cash. On Cohen\u2019s world, Able can do none of these things because there is no one to do them with. Able is like the worker in a\u00a0communist\u00a0<\/i>world, who may be employed only by the state.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0And Cohen compares him to the workers in\u00a0capitalism<\/i>. I think, \u201cThis Marxist does some fine card tricks, but he wins by stacking the deck.\u201d<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0<\/span><\/p>

Deconstructing responsibility\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The hard sell for the libertarian is neither liberty nor property. It is responsibility.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0I ask Friedman twice about the argument against the welfare state in Charles Murray\u2019s\u00a0In Pursuit of Happiness and Good Government\u00a0<\/i>(1994). Murray argues that what people want is a satisfying life, and that a good society should allow ordinary people to have satisfying lives.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Deep satisfaction, Murray says, comes from effort to achieve a meaningful goal. And what, for the ordinary person, could fit that bill better than working hard, supporting a family and raising capable and moral children? Before the welfare state, even the poor American who did this was respectable. As Garet Garrett wrote in 1947, recalling a maxim of his youth:\u00a0\u201cTo be poor is no disgrace.\u00a0<\/i>In the whole civilized world that was only true here, and it was true here because no stigma, no hint of caste, no sense of status attached itself to the condition of being poor.\u201d<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The welfare state takes this away\u2014not because it taxes the strong, but because it pauperizes the weak.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Friedman has asked us what we think of the suggestion from liberal theorist Bruce Ackerman that the government provide each new adult with a capital grant \u2014 say, $20,000. This could be for tuition or tools or a down payment on a house or a binge on cocaine and hookers.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Murray\u2019s answer would be to earn the money. It is not just that the person will \u201cappreciate\u201d it more, though he will. Also the person will have learned how to earn and save $20,000. Others will benefit because he will have become a producer of wealth rather than a waster of it.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0I think of the $20,000 and remember what it was like to be 21 years old. God help them, academics can be as stupid as fire plugs.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Friedman dismisses Murray\u2019s argument as \u201cbourgeois complacency.\u201d In \u201cWhat\u2019s Wrong With Libertarianism,\u201d he explains what he means. People experience more than one kind of happiness. One might think of the happiness of watching one\u2019s child graduate from college, of reading poetry, of watching TV, of feeling a full belly, or of a debauch in a whorehouse. Why, Friedman asks, does Murray favor the achiever\u2019s happiness?<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0I suppose it is because, through introspection, Murray decided the achiever\u2019s happiness is deeper and more lasting, and is the sort that should matter most. Perhaps also because it is more socially useful.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Friedman asks whether all humans at all times have felt this achiever\u2019s happiness. Our warm feeling, elicited by Murray, could be the result of \u201cbourgeois society, and thus our own bourgeois sensibilities.\u201d In other words, a father providing for a wife and children may feel satisfied not because any man naturally would, but because his capitalist culture taught him to feel that way. People in some other culture might not feel that way, which would mean that libertarianism was culture-specific.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Yes, it might mean that.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Friedman offers another argument. In a market economy, he says, \u201cpeople are not, in fact, solely or even largely responsible for their good ill or fortune,\u201d so that the ability to make a good living \u201cdepends overwhelmingly on good luck.\u201d<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0John Rawls argues this, too, in\u00a0A Theory of Justice.\u00a0<\/i>If it were true, it would be deadly to capitalism. It is true of the economic position of children\u2014it depends on their luck in having successful parents\u2014and it is the principal reason why capitalist societies have socialized their schools. But the \u201cyou\u2019re not responsible\u201d thesis is generally not true of adults. One\u2019s starting place in life is determined by luck, but one\u2019s ending place is not.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0What I see among the adults is that they are overwhelmingly self-made.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Friedman calls this \u201cVictorian psychology.\u201d<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0<\/span><\/p>

\u2018Voice\u2019 and \u2018Exit\u2019<\/span><\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The first day at Princeton has been a hosing-down. The fellow from the trade paper cannot stand it.\u00a0\u00a0He leans back with\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t

\n\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t

his arms crossed over his belly, scowling. The next morning he checks out, telling one of the participants, \u201cMy vacation is too valuable to waste.\u201d<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0I am having too good a time to leave. Friedman is a smart guy, and I like following his line of thought.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Up to now, Friedman has been arguing that libertarian philosophy amounts to chasing our tails. But he does accept free-market economics. Thanks to Ludwig von Mises, Friedman says, we can rule out central planning. The problem is that central planning has been vanquished. Nobody believes in it anymore (not even Marxists). Our enemy today is the administrative state.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0To reach a libertarian position, \u201cyou need a theory of politics,\u201d Friedman says\u2014not just a theory of how the market works,\u00a0but a theory of how the government works.<\/i><\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The economists\u2019 candidate is public choice theory. This is an extension of economics to government. It treats people in government as profit maximizers, all trying to puff up their power and the size of their agencies. The problem is, Friedman argues, it\u2019s too often not true.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Our readings have some examples. One is a story on the McCain-Feingold law, which banned certain political contributions. The Democrats relied most on those contributions. Public choice theory would predict that the Democrats would fight McCain-Feingold and the Republicans support it. Reality was the opposite. The two sides followed their ideologies, not their wallets.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0This happens often enough to be more than an exception to the rule. \u201cIt is a grotesque falsification to assume that our opponents are driven by economic concerns,\u201d Friedman says. I agree.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The popular alternative to public choice theory is the theory of democracy offered by Democrats and Republicans. And that, Friedman argues, is not realistic either.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0He refers us to\u00a0Public Opinion<\/i>, written in 1922 by journalist Walter Lippmann. Lippmann asks how the people in a democracy are supposed to know what is going on. They rely on the press. But the press is a wandering spotlight. Journalists have to make quick decisions, using preconceived notions of what is news. Every day, they are enticed by press agents who say, \u201cShine the spotlight\u00a0here,\u201d<\/i>because it is in somebody\u2019s interest that it be shined there. Often they do. The mass-market press also will be drawn to what is entertaining rather than what is dull.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0I am a member of the press, and recognize all these criticisms as true.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Then comes the news consumer. His attention is limited. Like the journalist, he has preconceived notions, and a liking for entertainment. The actual work of government bores him. Therefore he will be largely ignorant of what his government does.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Lippmann reached this conclusion before TV news and talk radio. It was true then and is true today.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Next comes one of Friedman\u2019s nuggets of research: \u201cThe Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,\u201d a 1964 article by Philip Converse. Converse finds that less than 4 percent of American voters can give a coherent account of what liberals and conservatives believe. These people he calls \u201cideologues.\u201d They understand the political division in society well, and their voting reflects it. A slightly larger group of voters partly understands and partly votes that way. A large group in the middle votes mainly by race, class, or other group affiliation. Below them is a fourth group, quite large, that votes on a politician\u2019s looks, or whether he \u201ccares about people like me.\u201d<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0What Converse finds is that liberal and conservative parties win elections because of changes in the votes of the two groups at the bottom\u2014the people who don\u2019t know ideology from acorns. This picture of the ignorant voter, says Friedman, has been verified again and again.\u00a0\u00a0\u201cBut very few political scientists have the imagination to think what it means.\u201d<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0It means is that a smart society cannot be run mainly by the puny political resources of voters.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Voting is based on the idea that every adult citizen should have a voice. Capitalize that:\u00a0Voice<\/i>. The first problem with the power of Voice, already discussed, is that it requires the voter to have more information than he will undertake to get, and to do more thinking that he will undertake to do.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The second problem is that one vote is worthless. In order to make Voice heard, you have to convince many others to add their votes to yours, which means making a public campaign. Unless your side wins, you get nothing.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0What Voice gives the individual voter is the appearance of power without actually having any. Those who influence electoral majorities, those who operate the state and those who influence them hold the real power.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Compare this with the market. It gives you a different power, called Exit. That is, you have the right not to make a purchase, not to renew a lease, not to continue working in a job. You can keep your money, move out, and quit your job. You can Exit.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Friedman got the names Voice and Exit from another \u201cnugget\u201d of political science, Alfred Hirschman\u2019s academic paper, \u201cExit, Voice and Loyalty\u201d (1970). Hirschman does not champion Exit. Friedman does.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The first reason to prefer Exit is that even in the singular it gets us something valuable: to get out of a bad deal.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The other virtue of Exit, Friedman says, is that it \u201cdoes not require us to think.\u201d To say \u201cno\u201d to a market transaction requires no knowledge of public questions, only of what is in front of our noses. The market handles the public question, which is, say, how many one-bedroom apartments to build and what price to set on the ones available for rent. The market makes this decision without any single participant having to think for the whole.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Says Friedman: \u201cExit is compatible with the complexity of the world.\u201d<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0I like Exit. It is an intriguing label, but I peel back the label and I see an older name underneath it: Liberty. It may not be exactly the same, but it is very close.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0<\/span><\/p>

An offensive idea<\/span><\/b><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The sum of Friedman\u2019s theory is that capitalist rights allow people to get what they want from the market much more reliably than democratic rights allow them to get what they want from the state. Therefore, maximize the market and minimize the state.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0His view of politics is frankly elitist. Even when it looks as if voters are sending a clear message, they\u2019re probably not. When voters elected a Republican House of Representatives in 1994 it did not mean Americans swung from left to right, because most Americans cannot articulate what \u201cleft\u201d and \u201cright\u201d mean. If the elites believed it meant that, their belief was more important than the event.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0This reminds me of a friend who works in state politics. He says the value of newspaper editorials is not that they influence the public. They influence decision-makers\u2014not to change their beliefs, but to affect their propensity to act. An editorial saying, \u201cDo this,\u201d validates the decision-maker who wants to do it. Says my friend, \u201cIt provides cover.\u201d<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0If you want to influence government, influence elites.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0This view is not only realistic but also offensive, in several senses of the word. Rather than building up a libertarian citadel and defending it, it goes on the offensive against the modern democratic state. Those who are true believers in the state will find this argument\u00a0offensive\u00a0<\/i>in the second sense. When I wrote a newspaper column explaining and endorsing Friedman\u2019s argument against democracy, one reader set up a booth on the sidewalk in front of where I work with a banner that read:<\/span><\/p>

Election 2003<\/span><\/i><\/b><\/p>

Is Bruce Ramsey an Ignorant Ass?<\/span><\/i><\/b><\/p>

Vote Here<\/span><\/i><\/b><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0I asked him what he was about, and he said he was doing it to show his disgust with my point of view.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0It\u2019s not a point of view anyone is used to hearing. It\u2019s fresh, it\u2019s provocative, and it pisses off the progressives.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0While such a view is dismissive of the public wisdom, it is not dismissive of one\u2019s opponents, nor need it necessarily demonize them. I demonize the Marxists but Friedman is scrupulously polite, even to academic Reds. He says it is a mistake for libertarians to label leftists as evil. Leftists don\u2019t understand the market. \u201cWe have a theory that highlights certain facts, which causes those facts to jump out at us,\u201d he says. \u201cThey don\u2019t have that theory.\u201d<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Friedman believes he can impart that theory much more effectively explained his way \u2014 an empirical, look-at-the-real-world way. Friedman has done this himself, because he also gives seminars to liberals.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0I didn\u2019t attend one of those. But I have the reading list, and can compare it to the one for the right-wingers. Many of the selections are the same, starting with Friedman\u2019s two favorite thinkers, Max Weber and Walter Lippmann. But the lefties are given more readings about the market and fewer about politics.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Here are some comments from a seminar for left-liberals. \u201cIt was an excellent experience that I can unwaveringly say changed the way I look at the world,\u201d writes one student who said she came \u201cfrom a socialist background.\u201d Another says, \u201cThis was an amazing experience. I have certainly never been exposed to strong libertarian arguments.\u201d Another writes, \u201cI am more open and, yes, Jeff, more libertarian than I would have guessed possible after a three-day seminar.\u201d<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0These evaluations are responding not only to Friedman\u2019s ideas, but also to Friedman\u2019s way of teaching. He is an engaging man, even when sawing off your political limb.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0<\/span><\/p>

Consequences, for those who care<\/span><\/b><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0At the end, I joke to the student next to me: \u201cWe came here believing in liberty, and we leave here believing that voters are ignoramuses.\u201d<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u201cSomething like that.\u201d he says.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Not that all my ideas have been shifted. I am older than Friedman and two decades older than any of the other attendees, and probably not subject to total conversions.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0With that caveat, a few concluding thoughts.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0First, on\u00a0a priori\u00a0<\/i>versus consequentialist arguments: Each side paints a caricature of the other. The consequentialists think of the\u00a0a priori\u00a0<\/i>side as being for principle of X, even if everyone starves because of X. The\u00a0a priori\u00a0<\/i>folks see the consequentialists as principle-free, deciding each question on the spur of the moment.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The reality is, everybody in this debate uses principles. And principles, even natural rights, are established with a mind to consequences. The difference is in the level of abstraction of the argument, and of the principle. One party wants an exclusive rule for a broad category; another wants separate rules for smaller categories, and to balance one rule against another.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0If you incline to radicalism, you will go for few rules that apply broadly. But the ultimate end has got to be consequences: the good society, the fulfilling life, lots of smiling faces \u2014 something like that \u2014 and anyone who severs\u00a0all\u00a0<\/i>connection between his political theory and worldly consequences may be dismissed as a fool.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0I agree with Friedman about that.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0My second thought is that in American political culture, \u201cliberty\u201d is a good and heroic word. It appears on the coins back to the 19th century. I am\u00a0not\u00a0<\/i>going to share it with Marxists. There are cultural reasons not to. There are tactical reasons, and reasons of substance. The classical liberal conception of liberty, moralized though it is, does give the individual more control of his destiny than any socialist conception. In our political journals we may rename this \u201cExit,\u201d but I don\u2019t ever expect to see Lady Liberty replaced by Ms. Exit.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0My third thought is that libertarians need Charles Murray\u2019s argument for individual responsibility. And it is a convincing argument to many ordinary people. At the Liberty Fest convention in 2004 I buttonholed Murray and asked him about that argument, and he said, \u201cThat\u2019s the one most people intuitively agree with. People who are not libertarians\u2014that\u2019s\u00a0<\/i>the one that moves them, especially those of us who had parents who were poor. They\u00a0snap\u00a0<\/i>to that argument.\u201d<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0If libertarians do not assert that self-reliance is good for the individual and good for the society, why do they favor it?\u00a0\u00a0Friedman\u2019s argument about Voice and Exit will get us, for example, to publicly financed school vouchers (as Hirschman noted in 1970), but it is not clear he can take it beyond that.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0My fourth thought is that one of the weakest links in capitalism is corporate governance, the relationship between shareholders, directors and managers. Here we find insider trading, self-dealing and golden parachutes, which, despite the hot denials of some libertarians, are obvious forms of corruption. This corruption arises from the weakness of Voice, not Exit. Score one for Friedman here.<\/span><\/p>

My fifth thought is that at the heart of all political arguments is something subjective. It\u2019s consequences, but\u00a0the consequences you care about<\/i>.\u00a0\u00a0\u201cMy axiom is happiness,\u201d Friedman says, and \u201chappiness is whatever puts a smile on your face.\u201d (The happiness of contemplating a life\u2019s achievement? The happiness of watching Cartoon Network?) Libertarians should be for capitalism, Friedman says, because the market can make more people smile than the government can.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0So it can. Friedman\u2019s argument for Exit rather than Voice is ingenious, and I like it. But it is not\u00a0why\u00a0<\/i>I\u2019m on the side I\u2019m on. I am the man with the painting. That the political system allows me to keep what\u2019s mine is a\u00a0consequence\u00a0<\/i>that interests me. That most people would have higher disposable income under a system of property rights is nice. It means I don\u2019t have to feel guilty about keeping my painting. But the painting is the first thing, not the per-capita GDP.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Finally to Friedman.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Because he attacks the philosophical libertarianism of Ayn Rand and Murray Rothbard, Friedman has been attacked as a renegade. In a letter to me, he writes:<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u201cThus far, every single libertarian who has commented in print on the project I\u2019m engaged in has gotten so caught up in defending the familiar forms of libertarianism that they have left completely unexamined, and unremarked, the fact that I\u2019m presenting a\u00a0new\u00a0<\/i>and arguably defensible form of libertarianism.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u201cIf the people in the free-market world keep getting the message that\u00a0Critical Review\u2019s\u00a0<\/i>project is \u2018anti-libertarian,\u2019 their lack of support will spell the end of that project, and of the incredible success it is having in persuading talented young people who would otherwise become leftist journalists, politicians and scholars.\u201d<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0I wish him good fortune.<\/span><\/p>

\u00a0<\/span><\/p>

\u00a9 2004 Bruce Ramsey<\/span><\/em><\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0By the early 2000s I was listed as a senior editor of Liberty, which really meant that I had written a lot of stuff Bill Bradford liked, though he didn\u2019t agree with all of it. In the summer of 2003, Liberty senior editor Steve Cox, a professor of literature at University of California […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-595","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/bruceramsey.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/595","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/bruceramsey.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/bruceramsey.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bruceramsey.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bruceramsey.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=595"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/bruceramsey.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/595\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":840,"href":"https:\/\/bruceramsey.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/595\/revisions\/840"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/bruceramsey.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=595"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}